Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.
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Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations
Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam. Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: Here is how to contribute.
Verified email at columbia. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. The Economics of Contracts: New citations to this author. This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists.
Journal of the Econometric Society, economcis, Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5.
The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1
It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article.
Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort? Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6.
Search for items with the same title. Articles 1—20 Show more. Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index 39 27 iindex 69 Journal of Political Economy 3, Two chapters have been completely rewritten: New articles by this author.
EconPapers: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1
The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard.
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Title Cited by Year The economics of contracts: For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which econkmics includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics.
Articles Cited by Co-authors. My profile My library Metrics Alerts. Asymmetric information in insurance: This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar.
Professor of Economics, Columbia University. The following articles are merged in Scholar. Estimating preferences under risk: The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: The system can’t perform the operation now. D86 C70 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn.
New articles related to this author’s research. The economics of contracts: Email address for updates. Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu.